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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper we review the academic papers on 
corporate governance of banks published from 1990 
to 2018. The review is conducted in two steps: we 
firstly apply a systematic literature review to 
identify the relevant papers in this topic, then we 
run a meta-analysis methodology to assess the 
prevailing results of prior researchers. We restrict 
the research on three main areas of corporate 
governance of banks, given their importance from 
both academics and policy makers perspectives: risk 
management; ownership structure and executive 
compensation. As a matter of fact, banks are in the 
business of taking risks. Since the crisis, risk 
management function has received increasing 
attention due to its decisive role in risk-avoiding, 
that has been revealed to be insufficient and weak 
(Brogi & Lagasio, 2018). Thus, banking regulatory 
bodies have responded, proposing long overdue 
principles of good Corporate Governance 
(McConnell, 2011). In particular, National authorities 
have taken several measures to improve regulatory 
and supervisory oversight of risk governance at 
financial institutions so as to ensure sound risk 
governance through changing environments and 
tightening up on the roles and responsibilities of 
boards of directors (Brogi, 2011). These measures 
include developing or strengthening existing 
regulation or guidance, raising supervisory 
expectations for the risk management function, 
engaging more frequently with the board and 
management, and assessing the accuracy and 
usefulness of the information provided to the board 
to enable effective discharge of their responsibilities 
(FSB, 2013). The second pillar of Basel II identifies 
the role of the board as an integral aspect of risk 
management, therefore aligning the internal 
governance structure in the light of comprehensive 
risk management approach seemed like an 
immediate need. Both academics and policy makers 
recognize that two of the most important internal 
governance mechanisms which support the 
comprehensive risk management framework are the 
establishment of an independent Chief Risk Officer 
(CRO) and/or Risk Management Committee that will 
have an oversight responsibility for all risks 
undertaken by the bank. Indeed, assigning the role 
of risk management to a board-level committee is 
becoming more common among large companies, 
notably in the financial sector (OECD, 2017). From 
an Institutional perspective, the EP (2013) 
encourages Member States to introduce principles 
and standards to ensure effective oversight by the 
management body, promote a sound risk culture at 
all levels of credit institutions and investment firms 
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and enable competent authorities to monitor the 
adequacy of internal governance arrangements. In 
order to assess the progress of national authorities 
and the banking industry in the area of risk 
governance since the global financial crisis, the FSB 
issued a Thematic review on risk governance in 
February 2013 as part of its series of peer reviews. 
The peer review found that financial institutions and 
national authorities have taken measures to improve 
risk governance. Nonetheless, standard setters' 
attention and awareness to this issue is being given 
mostly since the early aftermath of the last financial 
crises1. However, more work is needed by both 
national authorities and banks to establish effective 
risk governance frameworks and to enumerate 
expectations for third-party reviews of the 
framework. Banks also need to enhance the 
authority and independence of CROs. For instance, 
National authorities need to strengthen their ability 
to assess the effectiveness of a bank's risk 
governance and its risk culture and should engage 
more frequently with the board and its risk and 
audit committees (BCBS, 2015). The results of the 
analysis on this topic, confirms its constantly 
increasing relevance since the crisis and shows that 
academic literature still presents mixed result. A 
second widely researched topic in banking 
Corporate Governance literature (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986) is Ownership structure. From a firms 
perspective, it was initially inspected by Berle and 
Means (1932), whose study points out the issue of 
the separation of ownership and control, being 
"concerned with the survival of organizations in 
which important decision agents do not bear a 
substantial share of the wealth effects of their 
decisions" (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). They also 
discover that firms' performance is negatively 
affected by a diffuse ownership structure. 
Concerning this issue, the agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) identifies managers as the agents 
whose function is to maximize shareholders' 
interests, recognised as principals. In a situation of 
separation between ownership and control, agents, 
who are not owners of the firm, may commit “moral 
hazards' since their interests are not aligned with 
those of principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This 
view is consistent with Jensen (1983b) who also 
identifies two different solutions in order to solve 
principal-agency problems. One is to align principals 
and agents' risk-taking and the other is to enhance 
the monitoring of ownership structure. Agency 
theorists have long considered concentrated 
ownership as a governance mechanism that may 
reduce agency costs (Glassman & Rhoades, 1980; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Indeed, in those 
companies with concentrated ownership structures, 
"horizontal" agency problems that arise between 
controlling and minority shareholders are the 
                                                          
1 For instance, OECD (2009) states: "Perhaps one of the greatest shocks from 
the financial crisis has been the widespread failure of risk management. In 
many cases risk was not managed on an enterprise basis and not adjusted to 
corporate strategy. Risk managers were often kept separate from 
management and not regarded as an essential part of implementing the 
company's strategy. Most important of all, boards were in a number of cases 
ignorant of the risk facing the company." EBA (2011) states that an 
institution shall develop an integrated and institution-wide risk culture, 
based on a full understanding of the risks it faces and how they are 
managed, taking into account its risk tolerance/appetite. 
predominant concern, while "vertical" agency 
problems that arise between managers and 
shareholders may be mitigated (Vermeulen, 2013). 
Indeed, in the last decade, even countries 
characterised by dispersed ownership structures, 
have introduced special arrangements to address the 
"horizontal" agency problems that can arise between 
controlling and minority shareholders (OECD, 2017). 
Nonetheless, the effect of the separation of 
ownership and control has been left undetermined 
and is still focus of debate. Specifically related to 
banks, Ownership has been investigated in the 
literature of last 30 years, as outlined further in this 
paper. The meta-analysis shows that previous 
researches related to the effect of Ownership 
structure on risk do not identify a prevailing result 
in determining the best configuration of the 
variables. Conversely, there is a clearer 
understanding of the impact of Ownership structure 
on bank performance: banks with high level of Board 
ownership, CEO ownership and Controlling 
shareholders enhance their performance. Finally, 
executive compensation is a hot subject for 
researchers in banks' corporate governance 
especially in the aftermath of 2007/2008 financial 
crises (OECD, 2015). Indeed, there is a wide 
consensus in the literature regarding executive 
compensation that its level and composition may 
increase the risk-taking behavior of bank managers 
(Houston & James, 1995; Adams & Mehran, 2003; 
Webb, 2008; Bebchuk et al., 2010; Gropp & Kohler, 
2010; Grove et al., 2011; DeYoung et al., 2013; 
Chaigneau, 2013). This is the reason why both 
principle setter and regulators identify it as a critical 
issue in banks' soundness and stability. Moreover, 
executive compensation has also become a topic of 
intense debate among principles setters (e.g. OCSE, 
2015; 2017; BCBS, 2015; EBA, 2015), regulators (e.g. 
EP, 2013) and media (e.g. Rajan, 2008; Rajan et al. 
2008; Kyrkpatric, 2009), with a particular focus on 
CEO compensation (Bai & Elyasiani, 2013; 
Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011; Thanassoulis, 2011; 
Hagendorff & Vallascas, 2011; Tian & Yang, 2014). 
Remuneration structure, and in particular, executive 
compensation, is one of the most debated topic in 
Corporate Governance literature of both firms and 
financial institutions. Also principle setters discuss 
about this subject in detail defining remuneration as 
a practice supporting Corporate Governance 
soundness (OECD, 2004; 2015; BCBS, 2010; 2015). 
Moreover, to achieve soundness it is emphasized 
that remuneration policy should be focused on the 
longer run interests of the company over short term 
considerations (OECD, 2004; 2015; BCBS, 2010; 
2015). Referring in particular to financial 
institutions, BCBS asserts that remuneration 
structure is also linked to bank risk-taking behavior, 
furthermore it should be in line with the business 
and risk strategy, objectives. To sum up, both 
standard setters and regulators pay attention to 
executives' compensation, due to the need of 
concern and awareness regarding this issue. The 
ability of the board to effectively oversee executive 
remuneration appears to be a key challenge in 
practice and remains one of the central elements of 
the Corporate Governance debate in a number of 
jurisdictions. Implementation of the OECD Principles 
thus remains a challenge (OECD, 2010). Focusing on 
banks, BCBS (2010) in the first edition of its 
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Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance 
developed suggestions regarding compensation and 
link compensation systems to both bank 
performance and risk. The Committee in the same 
year also provided the Compensation Principles and 
Standards Assessment Methodology (2010) so as to 
"guide supervisors in reviewing individual firms' 
compensation practices and assessing their 
compliance with the FSB Principles and Standards, 
and seeks to foster supervisory approaches that are 
effective in promoting sound compensation 
practices at banks and help support a level playing 
field." From an institutional perspective, the EC 
issued legislative proposals to grant shareholders 
the right to vote on remuneration policy and the 
remuneration report (EC, 2014). Moreover, the CRD 
IV approved by the EP in 2013 impose a cap on 
banking executives' incentives. Indeed, many 
jurisdictions have adopted rules on prior 
shareholder approval of equity-based incentive 
schemes for board members and key executives. 
More recently, EBA (2015) provide a draft of its 
Guidelines to set out the governance process for 
implementing sound remuneration policies across 
the EU and also aim to identify specific criteria for 
mapping all remuneration components into either 
fixed or variable pay. At a national level, United 
Kingdom (2002) introduced a non-binding 
shareholder vote on executive compensation "Say-
on-Pay", which one of the main aims was to improve 
performance linkage of executive pay. This practice 
was also followed by US (2010) and Australia (2011). 
Furthermore, in UK new rules came into force in 
September 2013, where publicly traded companies 
are required to submit the company's remuneration 
policy report for a binding shareholder vote at least 
every three years. To sum up, there has been a rich 
policy effort to entail firms, and especially banks to 
achieve a more long- term-oriented awareness 
regarding compensation structure and also a better-
defined performance based view to reduce excessive 
risk-taking, as a response to the financial crisis. This 
premise confirms the relevance of this paper, which 
helps in clarifying the understanding of the 
relationship between corporate governance of banks 
and their performance and risk. It contributes to the 
literature on banks' corporate governance by trying 
to identify the prevailing results and the existence of 
best practices in Risk management, Ownership 
structure and Compensation of banks. Thus, this 
paper may also be relevant in terms of policy 
implication. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as 
follows: section 2 review the literature on the three 
selected area of corporate governance; section 3 
explains the methodology; results are reported in 
section 3; and section 4 concludes by commenting 
the obtained results and suggesting for further 
researches. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1.  Risk management 
 
The systematic literature on the relation between 
banks' corporate governance and risk management 
shows that academic literature still presents mixed 
result in this research area. Aebi et al. (2012), using 
data on 573 US banks over the crises period (1st July 
2007 to 31st December 2008), investigate whether 
risk management-related Corporate Governance 
mechanisms, made banks perform better during the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008. In particular, they 
examine if the presence of a CRO in a bank's 
executive board and whether the CRO reports to the 
CEO or directly to the BoD, are associated with a 
better bank performance measured by buy-and-hold-
returns and ROE, controlling for various Corporate 
Governance characteristics (CEO ownership, board 
size, and board independence). Findings reported in 
their paper show that banks, in which the CRO 
directly reports to the BoD and not to the CEO, 
performed significantly better in terms of both 
performance measures. A similar result is provided 
by Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). They explore the 
implication of a strong and independent RM to bank 
risk-taking and performance using a sample of 74 
large US BHCs over the period 1995–2010. They 
construct a Risk Management Index (RMI), which is 
based on five variables related to the strength of a 
bank's RM (CRO Present, a dummy variable that 
identifies if the BHC has a designated CRO; CRO 
Executive, a dummy variable that identifies if the 
CRO is an executive officer; CRO-Top5, a dummy 
variable that identifies if the CRO is among the five 
highest paid executives; and CRO Centrality, defined 
as the ratio of the CRO's total compensation to the 
CEO's total compensation). The authors find that 
banks with a higher RMI value in 2006 performed 
better in the crisis period than others, and were also 
less risky. Their conclusions are supported by lower 
tail risk and lower level of NPLs for better risk-
managed banks in 2006. Zagorchev and Gao (2015) 
use 41 factors of the RiskMetrics' Corporate 
Governance index (CG41) to examine how Corporate 
Governance affects US financial institutions over the 
period 2002-2009. The authors find a negative 
relationship between better governance and 
excessive risk-taking (proxied by non-performing 
assets and real estate non-performing assets). 
Moreover, their results also support a positive 
association between better governance and 
performance (measured by Tobin's Q). Mongiardino 
and Plath (2010) investigate the role of independent 
directors in RM. According to this study risk 
governance requires a dedicated board-level risk 
committee, of which a majority should be 
independent, and that the CRO should be part of the 
bank's executive board. Based on a survey among 20 
large banks, they find that only a small number of 
banks followed these guidelines in 2007. Most risk 
committees were not comprised of enough 
independent and financially knowledgeable 
members. Similarly, Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) 
examine auditor independence in the banking 
industry by analyzing the relation between fees paid 
to auditors and the extent of earnings management 
through loan loss provisions. They find that 
especially relating to small banks, auditor fee 
dependence on the audit client is associated with 
earnings management via abnormal loan loss 
provisions. Thus, the authors also suggest to 
policymakers to contemplate new regulations in 
light of the banking crisis. A complementary view is 
provided by Barakat and Hussainey (2013) who 
recommend to enhance risk disclosures by 
establishing independent specialized national 
committees or task forces to monitor and advise 
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Pillar 3 disclosures in banks. As a matter of fact, 
academic literature still presents mixed result, 
furthermore, "there exist fundamental risk-incentive 
mechanisms that operate in exactly the opposite 
direction" (Boyd et al., 2005). Furthermore, the 
diversity among financial system institutions lead to 
different risks faced by banks, supporting the 
unlikeliness to apply a single instrument of financial 
stability policy (Ellis et al., 2014). CEOs are key 
decision makers. In particular, their risk propensity 
has a decisive role in the definition of the strategy of 
the bank (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). As a 
consequence, their position has a strong effect on 
both bank risk and performance. For instance, Luu 
(2015) finds that more powerful CEO tend to engage 
in less risky activities. However, empirical research 
on the impact of CEO duality on banks' risks 
(Simpson and Gleason, 1999; Pathan, 2009, 
Boujelbène and Nabila, 2011, De Jonghe et al., 2012, 
Rachdi et al., 2013; Cornelli et al., 2013) provide 
different conclusion and most of the findings are 
not supported by sufficient significance. Finally, as 
concerns risk management, Aebi et al. (2012) and 
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) find that banks in which 
the Chief Risk Officer directly reports to the board 
of directors and not to the Chief Executive Officer 
performed significantly better in terms of both 
performance and risk measures. Mongiardino and 
Plath (2010) governance requires a dedicated board-
level risk committee, of which a majority should be 
independent, and that the CRO should be part of the 
bank's executive board. 
 
2.2.  Ownership structure 
 
Researches related to ownership structure can be in 
turn divided in two different strands of literature. A 
first sub-field deals in ownership concentration, the 
other is focused on owners' type. Concerning the 
first dimension, one of the studies who investigate 
the empirical relationship between ownership 
concentration and profitability in banks is Shehzad 
et al. (2010) which results show that concentrated 
ownership has a significant positive effect on bank 
risk-avoiding. Indeed, the authors, use a sample 
composed by 500 cross-country banks over the 
period 2005-2007 and find that a higher level of 
concentration lead to a reduction of NPLs ratio. 
Similarly, Adnan et al. (2011) investigate the 
efficiency of Malaysian listed banks during 1997-
1998, trying to link it with banks' ownership 
structure. The authors, using a GLS multivariate 
regression, find that block ownership lead to better 
efficiency of Malaysian banks, as measured by both 
the ratios between NPLs and total loans and between 
operating expenses and total assets. They also 
justify this result by arguing that the significance of 
concentrated ownership could suggest better 
monitoring by the block-holders. This is consistent 
with Azofra and Santamaria (2011) who investigate 
Spanish banks. Lately, Grove et al. (2011) do not 
provide much support that concentrated ownership 
lead to positive effects on banks performance. 
Indeed, the authors find a weak association between 
the two variables. Contrariwise, Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012) show a strong relationship between 
concentrated ownership and bank risk-taking 
especially during the recent financial crisis in US. 
Following this view, Busta et al. (2014) focusing on 
data of European banks over the period 1993-2005, 
find a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and banks market value. In particular, 
they use a GMM dynamic estimator that lead them to 
find a negative effect of ownership concentration on 
banks Tobin's Q. Nonetheless, their major finding is 
that the obtained results varies across different 
institutional settings. Indeed, the negative effect is 
particularly strong in countries belonging to 
Germany, France or Common law legal tradition, 
contrariwise, the authors find a positive effect of 
concentration on Scandinavian banks. Busta et al. 
(2014) argues that these differences could derive by 
the identity of the predominant owners (financial 
institutions and family in the first group, trusts and 
foundations in Scandinavia). Actually, as above 
mentioned, owners' type matter. The first study 
resulted by the research conducted that is related on 
this issue is Saunders et al. (1990). The authors show 
that stockholder controlled banks exhibit 
significantly higher risk-taking behavior than 
"managerially" controlled banks during the 1979-
1982 period of relative deregulation. Lately, 
Anderson and Fraser (2000) investigate whether or 
not managerial shareholdings affect banks risk-
taking of an International sample observed in the 
period 1987-1994. Their results show a strong a 
positive observation of the analysed variables, 
although they present some differences in the 
period 1980s, due to the financial distress and the 
less level of bank regulation. Consistent are also 
Anderson and Fraser (2000) and Kabigting (2011). 
The latter finds that insider ownership has 
significant positive relationship with ROA, bank size 
and Earning Per Share (EPS). Westman (2011) 
inspects a sample composed by 477 European 
traditional and non-traditional banks over 2000-
2006 and finds directors' ownership positively 
affecting traditional banks profitability, whereas 
management ownership has a similar effect in non-
traditional banks sample. At last, Berger et al. (2012) 
by looking for a relationship between different 
Corporate Governance drivers and US commercial 
banks risk, provide evidence that banks' probability 
of default is strongly and negatively affected by 
insider ownership. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find 
that higher insider ownership and higher sensitivity 
of CEO wealth to bank performance represent better 
alignment of interests. Indeed, there is a strand of 
literature regarding banks ownership, trying to asses 
specifically the association of CEO ownership and 
bank efficiency, obtaining mixed results. For 
instance, Pathan (2009) find statistically significant 
and positive coefficients regressing bank risks (total 
risk, idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk) over CEO 
ownership percentage. This result can be justified by 
showing that as the percentage of bank CEOs 
shareholdings increase, their risk preferences 
coincide with bank shareholders and so increases 
bank risk. Berger et al. (2012) find that high 
shareholdings of CEO, lead to a reduction of banks 
probability of failure. This is also consistent with 
Aebi et al. (2012). Rachidi et al. (2013) find that a 
lower CEO ownership has no significant effect with 
all measures of risks. Another dichotomy concerning 
ownership structure, is related to state owned banks 
and private sector institutions. As resulted by this 
survey, many authors investigated this issue in the 
last decade. Berger et al. (2005) explore the effects of 
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domestic, foreign, and state ownership on bank 
performance of Argentinian banks during 1990s. 
The authors obtained strong and robust result 
showing that state owned banks have poor long-
term performance (static effect), those undergoing 
privatization had particularly poor performance 
beforehand (selection effect), and these banks 
dramatically improved following privatization 
(dynamic effect). Similar results are obtained by Kim 
and Rasiah (2010) by exploring a sample of 
Malaysian banks. Barry (2011), investigate this issue 
in a sample of European banks and find that publicly 
held banks do not affect risk-taking when changes in 
ownership structure occur. Focusing also on a 
sample of European banks Iannotta et al. (2013) and 
try to relate state ownership with bank risk as 
measure by default risk and operating risk. They 
analysis show different results, one of the most 
relevant is that government owned banks resulted to 
face lower default risk, but higher operating risk. 
Recent studies investigate the relation between 
institutional shareholding and bank risk-taking with 
results again not conclusive. Barry et al. (2011), 
Erkens et al. (2012) and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) 
show that that financial firms greater institutional 
ownership is associated with increases in risk-taking 
strategies of banks. Contrariwise, Knopf and Teall 
(1996) and Ferri (2009) report opposing findings, 
and this difference may be linked with the period of 
observation. Finally, a few studies assess the impact 
of regulation on banks ownership structure. In 
particular, Caprio et al. (2007) and Laeven and 
Levine (2009a; 2009b) investigate this issue and find 
evidence that bank regulation may increase or 
decrease bank risk-taking, depending upon the 
ownership structure. Levine (2004) and Barth et al. 
(2004) argue that regulation policies may limit the 
impact of traditional governance mechanisms. The 
authors also point out that Governments in many 
countries restrict the concentration of bank 
ownership and also impose limits on the purchase of 
shares by outsiders without regulatory approval. As 
a result, still there is not a clear answer about which 
is the optimal ownership structure in banks. 
 
2.3.  Compensation 
 
As a result of the analysis conducted in this paper, 
executive compensation is a hot subject for 
researchers especially in the aftermath of 
2007/2008 financial crisis. This is also denoted by 
academicians and principle setters. For example, 
OECD (2017) states that "since the financial crisis, 
much attention has been paid to the governance of 
the remuneration of board members and key 
executives". Indeed, most of the literature regarding 
executive compensation in the sample was 
developed from 2011. Moreover, executive 
compensation has also become a topic of intense 
debate among principles setters (e.g. OCSE, 2015; 
2017; BCBS, 2015; EBA, 2015), regulators (e.g. EP, 
2013), and media (e.g. Rajan, 2008; Rajan et al. 
2008), with a particular focus on CEO compensation. 
Nonetheless, the evidence linking compensation 
practices to the effect on banks' risks and 
performance is mixed. Focusing on an agency theory 
perspective, executive compensation and especially 
its variable part, is usually identified as one of the 
mechanism used to align managers' and 
shareholders' interests as well as to enhance 
executives' performance (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman & Hart, 1983; Murphy, 
1985). Moreover, following this theory an executive 
compensation structure is optimal when managers 
are motivated to encourage only risk increasing but 
positive NPV projects (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Amihud & Lev, 1981; Smith & Stulz, 1985). From an 
opposite perception, the development of the 
literature outlines the managerial power theory that 
states that the composition of incentive pay is 
perceived as a mechanism that misaligns executives' 
interests from those of shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 
2010). Indeed, as further investigated, there is a 
wide consensus in the literature regarding executive 
compensation that its level and composition may 
increase the risk-taking behavior of bank managers. 
This is the reason why both principle setter and 
regulators identify it as a critical issue in banks' 
soundness and stability. In particular, it should 
include procedures to avoid conflicts of interest and 
should also encourages employees to act in the 
interest of the company as a whole. Moreover, 
incentives embedded within remuneration 
structures should not promote excessive risk-taking 
(BCBS, 2015).  
As noted above, a wide strand of the literature 
states that higher (potential) compensation in 
banking institutions lead to higher risk-taking 
behavior (Houston and James, 1995; Adams and 
Mehran, 2003). Moreover, executives' incentives have 
also been identified as a driver of the recent 
financial crises of 2008 by several scholars (e.g., 
Kashyap et al., 2008; Kyrkpatric, 2009; Bebchuk et 
al., 2010). Consistent with the managerial power 
theory, Gropp and Kohler (2010) show that in their 
sample consisting of 1100 banks from 25 OECD 
countries from 2000 to 2008, aligning the interests 
of managers and shareholders increases risk-taking 
of banks. Nonetheless, as a matter of fact, the most 
important determinant of the effect of 
compensation is its composition. Indeed, many of 
the studies resulted by this survey are consistent 
with the view that on the one hand equity linked pay 
encourages risk- taking, contrariwise non-equity 
linked pay makes CEOs more risk-averse. As 
concerns equity linked CEO compensation, there 
may be a moral hazard behavior since these 
practices combine unlimited upside with limited 
downside potential risk, resulting in convex CEO 
pay-off linkage with marginal increases in bank risk. 
DeYoung et al. (2013) find a rapid increase of equity-
linked compensation in US banking over the last 
decade and show that this practice is more linked 
with higher risk in financial institution than in any 
other industry. Moreover, the author state that CEO 
compensation was changed to encourage executives 
to exploit new growth opportunities created by 
deregulation and debt securitization, but this is also 
a reason to incur in an increasing risk-taking 
behavior. In particular, banks' risk is measured by 
pay-performance sensitivity (delta), which is related 
to stock grants, and pay-risk sensitivity (vega), which 
is related to stock options grants. Findings of the 
authors asses that non-traditional banking income is 
strictly related to vega compensation. Similarly, Bai 
and Elyasiani (2013) use CEO compensation 
sensitivity to risk (vega) and pay-share inequality 
between the CEO and other executives as measures 
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of compensation. They aim to investigate the 
relationship between default risk and executive 
compensation for BHCs over the 1992–2008 period. 
Some of the most important findings deriving by 
their analysis are: CEO compensation sensitivity to 
risk of BHCs has risen in response to deregulation; 
higher CEO compensation sensitivity to risk lead to 
greater bank instability; the association between 
bank stability and managerial compensation is bi-
directional; higher vegas induce greater risk and vice 
versa. As mentioned above, regulating compensation 
structure is also a vital element in the risk-taking 
behavior of bank executives. In particular, Webb 
(2008) states that executive bank risk-taking due to 
remuneration structure is largely avoided when 
regulatory monitoring is high. Hence, strict 
regulatory framework is needed to preserve bank 
stability. Chaigneau (2013) analyses the effects of 
two regulatory mechanisms, namely a regulation of 
the structure of bank CEOs incentive pay and 
sanctions for the CEOs of failed banks, on bank risk-
shifting. The author argues that the current 
regulatory approach, which largely attempts to align 
the interests of bank CEOs with those of their 
shareholders, is flawed. Moreover, Chaigneau (2013) 
also suggests that banks' Corporate Governance 
arrangements could be well-adjusted into two 
alternative ways in order to ensure the efficiency 
structure of bank CEOs incentives. First, the 
regulator could let shareholders set both the level of 
pay and the level of incentives of bank CEOs, but it 
would impose some constraints on the structure of 
their incentive pay. Second, the regulator could 
threaten to punish the CEOs of failed banks. Any of 
these two mechanisms would ensure (at no extra 
cost) that bank CEOs have efficient risk-taking 
incentives, although argued that the first mechanism 
is more robust to modelling assumptions and 
parameter uncertainty. Different compensation 
policies provide different ways of aligning 
managerial and shareholder interests (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990). Cunat and Guadalupe (2008) 
investigate the effect of product market competition 
on the compensation packages of banks' executives, 
distinguishing the effect on total pay, estimated 
fixed pay and performance-pay sensitivities, and the 
sensitivity of stock option grants. Using a panel data 
of US banks in 1990s, they provide a difference-in-
differences estimation and find that deregulation 
has had a significant impact on the level and the 
structure of executives' compensation. In particular, 
the variable components of pay increased along with 
performance-pay sensitivities and, at the same time, 
the fixed component of pay fell. Similarly, Mehran 
and Rosenberg (2008) report a significant impact of 
pay-risk sensitivity on risk-taking (measured 
respectively by volatility of stock returns and write 
downs). Contrariwise, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) 
find no evidence of the relationship between bank 
performance and both CEO incentives (and 
ownership) during the credit crisis, furthermore the 
poor performance of banks during the crisis was the 
result of unforeseen risk. The authors investigate a 
sample of 98 financial firms, of which 95 are banks 
over the period 2006-2008. In particular, they study 
whether US banks with CEOs, whose incentives were 
better aligned with the interests of their 
shareholders, performed better during the crisis. 
Their findings show that the banks in the sample 
performed worse both in terms of stock returns and 
in terms of ROE. Closely to Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2011), Erkens et al. (2012) find that banks which 
performance was worse during the financial crisis 
are those offering non-equity based pay for their 
CEOs. An unclear view of the association between 
executives' compensation and bank performance is 
given by Grove et al. (2011) and by Acrey et al. 
(2011). The first authors apply agency theory to the 
banking industry and adopt the factor structure by 
Larcker et al. (2007) to measure multiple dimensions 
of Corporate Governance for 236 US public 
commercial banks during the financial crisis. They 
investigate the effect of executive compensation on 
both banks' financial performance and loan quality, 
obtaining mixed result. Indeed, they find that the 
extent of incentive executive pay is positively 
associated with financial performance (measured by 
ROA of 2006 and 2007 and excess stock return of 
2006), but it is negatively associated with loan 
quality (measured by the non-performing assets 
ratio of the average of the 2006–2008 period). They 
also capture the consequences of the mismatch 
between incentive systems and RM with a lack of 
risk adjusted financial targets in executive 
compensation. From another perspective with 
similar results, Luo (2015) examines the 
determinants of executive compensation in Chinese 
banking during 2005–2012. The author runs both a 
2 Squared Least Stages (2SLS) methods and a 
dynamic GMM regressions obtaining positive but no 
significant relationship with pay performance of 
CEOs although his result show that ownership 
structure (measured by ownership concentration 
and ownership identification) and compensation 
committee are significant in determining the amount 
of executive compensation. Actually, a wide 
compensation practice is to link CEO payment to 
bank performance (Minnick et al., 2011). More 
specifically, this kind of cash bonus is usually 
payable when earnings-based targets over at least 
one year are achieved and the payoff increases up to 
a maximum cap. Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003) 
investigate compensation strategies of commercial 
BHCs during 1992–2000. One of their findings show 
that pay-for-performance sensitivities are strongly 
larger for BHCs that have entered the underwriting 
business. Furthermore, and consistent with agency 
theory, the authors find also that pay-for-
performance sensitivities decline generally at BHCs 
as return variability increases. Continuing to follow 
an agency theory perspective, Cornett et al. (2009) 
look for a relationship between different Corporate 
Governance mechanisms and both bank earnings 
and earnings management by investigating data of 
the largest publicly traded BHCs in the US. During 
their analysis, they find that the estimation of the 
three variables was biased by high endogeneity. 
Thus, they continue their study by using a 
simultaneous equation approach and find that CEO 
pay-for-performance sensitivity, board 
independence, and capital are positively related to 
earnings and that earnings, board independence, 
and capital are negatively related to earnings 
management. In particular, as concerns pay-for-
performance, the authors find interesting results: it 
is positively related to both earnings management 
and board independence, and the latter relationship 
is bidirectional. Livne et al. (2011) investigate the 
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role of Fair Value Accounting (FVA) outcomes in 
determining compensation amount of US bank CEOs, 
finding a positive link between CEOs cash bonus and 
fair value (FV) accounting of both Held For Trading 
(HFT) (managed for short-term profit) and Available 
For Sale (AFS) assets. Hagendorff and Vallascas 
(2011) investigate the link between CEO cash 
bonuses and bank risks by using the Merton 
distance to default model on a sample composed by 
US and European firms. They find that increases in 
CEO cash bonuses lower the default probability of 
banks. Moreover, the authors find also that the risk-
reducing effect of CEO cash bonuses is mainly 
related to stronger regulatory environments and for 
non-distressed financial institutions. Similarly, Acrey 
et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between 
CEO compensation and bank default risk. They focus 
in particular on short term incentives to study if the 
latter could determine higher bank risk-taking. The 
authors use early warning off-site surveillance 
parameters and Expected Default Frequency (EDF) as 
well as crisis-related risky bank activities, and find 
that although compensation elements commonly 
thought to be the riskiest components (e.g. options 
and bonuses) are either insignificant or negatively 
correlated with common risk variables, and only 
positively significant in predicting the level of 
trading assets and securitization income. 
Contrariwise, Thanassoulis (2011) applying a 
theoretical model calibrated on US banking system 
data, demonstrates that overall remuneration 
represents a substantial expense for a bank which 
therefore contributes to default risk significantly. 
Lastly, the author suggests that cap on the 
proportion of the balance sheet which can be used 
for remuneration can lower bank default risk. Tian 
and Yang (2014) also focus on incentive pay of US 
banking CEOs and find a positive association with 
bank risk-taking. In particular, they investigate a 
sample composed by 179 financial institutions over 
the period 2005-2010 and distinguish commercial 
banks from non-commercial financial institutions 
(respectively 123 and 56), and find a trend for 
commercial bank CEOs to switch from cash bonuses 
into other forms of incentive compensation, if more 
desirable. Bhagat and Bolton (2014) conduct a study 
on 14 of the largest financial institutions during 
2000–2008. They focus different on features of CEO 
compensation (CEO's purchases and sales of their 
bank's stock, their salary and bonus, and the capital 
losses CEOs incur due to the dramatic share price 
declines in 2008) and consider three measures of 
risk-taking (Z-score, the banks' asset write-downs, 
and whether or not a bank borrows capital from FED 
bailout programs, and the amount of such capital). 
Their results agree with the analysis of Bebchuk et 
al. (2010) and assess the correlation between 
incentives generated by executive compensation 
programs and excessive risk-taking by bank. The 
authors also propose a compensation structure for 
senior bank executives: executive incentive 
remuneration should only contain restricted stock 
and restricted stock options. This kind of structure 
will properly fit the long-term incentives of the 
senior executives with the interests of the 
stockholders. Even though most of the literature 
regarding executives' compensation in banking is 
especially referred to CEOs, a few recent studies 
(Keys et al., 2009; Aebi et al., 2012; Ellul & Yerramilli, 
2013) are focused also on Chief Risk Officers (CROs) 
compensation in order to determine whether risk 
managers' activity effectiveness is related to a high 
level of compensation. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Sample 
 
We perform a systematic review of the literature that 
entails different steps: 
1. Choose Business Source Complete and 
ScienceDirect2 as research databases. 
2. Select only papers published in journals with a 
peer reviewed evaluation process. 
3. Search in the keywords the combination of 
"Corporate Governance" and "banks" or "financial 
institutions"). 
4. Restrict the sample to the articles related to Risk 
management, Ownership structure and 
Compensation, because of their increasingly 
attention received by Supervisors3. 
5. Ensure relevance of the articles by reading all 
abstracts and survey remaining articles by a 
complete reading in order to check for 
substantive relevance of the contents. 
6. Consolidate results. 
We obtain that the literature concerning the 
selected topic is mainly focused on risks potentially 
faced by banks and their performance capability. 
Specifically, Risk management, Ownership structure 
and Compensation are normally investigated 
considering their impact on risks and performance 
drivers. Indeed, Risk management function is 
responsible for identifying, measuring, monitoring, 
and recommending strategies to control and 
mitigate risks. It also reports on risk exposures of 
firms, so as to ensure a risk profile in line with the 
Risk Appetite Framework (RAF) approved by the 
Board of Directors. As concerns executive 
compensation, it is related with risk since an 
inadequate compensation structure may lead to 
excessive risk-taking. Finally, there is a wide strand 
of literature that relates risk and performance to the 
ownership structure and its concentration. 
 
3.2. Meta-analysis 
 
In order to have a complete understanding on the 
evolution of literature on corporate governance of 
banks, a meta-analysis methodology is applied, 
following Hunter et al. (1982). The latter is a 
systematic method that seeks to reconcile the 
findings of prior researches on a specific topic 
(Souissi & Khlif, 2012). This methods entails a two 
steps procedure: firstly, running the model to have 
                                                          
2 Business Source Complete and ScienceDirect are chosen since they are two 
of the leading databases for economics and management literature 
researches (Berggren and Karabag, 2012). I conduct an advanced research 
on these two sources, leading to diffrent results. For instance, the advanced 
search for the combination of the words "corporate governance" and "banks" 
in the keywords of the articles published in only academic peer reviewd 
journal in English language on ScienceDirect returned 253 results, 231 on 
Business Source Complete. 
3 as mentioned in the introduction, and also confirmed in the 15 Corporate 
governance principles for banks issued in 2015 by BCSBS which address 
these topics in principles 1-8 and 11. 
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an overall overview on the prevailing sign of the 
relationship between corporate governance and the 
independent variables (e.g risk and performance); 
then, running the analysis over specific corporate 
governance feature as identified by homogenous 
subgroups of variables (related to risk management, 
ownership and concentration), to clearly determine 
the relation in-between. We also test for the 
consistency across the sample, by checking for 
heterogeneity with the statistics proposed by 
Higgins and Thompson (2002) and Higgins et al. 
(2003):  
 
𝐼2 =
𝑥2 − 𝑑𝑓
𝑥2
 
 
where is 𝑥2 the 𝑥2 statistics and 𝑑𝑓 is its degrees of 
freedom. This allows to compute the portion of the 
variability that is due to heterogeneity rather than 
sampling error. Over the total sample, we obtain 
𝐼2 = 0.92, which means that 92% of the variability is 
due to heterogeneity and the studies included in the 
sample cannot be considered of the same 
population. 
The heterogeneity issue is then addressed in 
two different ways: performing a random effects 
model which assumes a Gaussian distribution to 
identify the effects of the different studies (Fleiss & 
Gross, 1991; DerSimonian & Laird 1985; Ades & 
Higgins, 2005; Higgins et al., 2009); running the 
subgroup analysis, as above explained, which looks 
also for interactions in each selected subgroup. To 
the first point, the random effects model is run at a 
95% confidence level, with the underline assumption 
that the true effect may be different over the sample 
(Borenstein et al., 2009).  
The proposed model is based on Pearson's 
correlations between independent and dependent 
variables assuming a bi-variate correlation analysis. 
Since Pearson's correlation is bounded 
between -1 and 1, we also need to correct the 
skewness for sampling distribution for highly 
correlated variables. Thus, we compute a Fisher’s r-
to-z transformation (Fisher, 1921) to the Pearson's 
correlation coefficient in order to transform the 
skewed distribution (r) into a distribution (z) that 
may be considered as a Gaussian distribution, with 
its variance coefficient independent from the initial 
computed correlation. This is done by estimating the 
standard error using the sample size of each study:  
 
𝑧 −
1
2
log
1 + 𝑟
1 − 𝑟
 
 
with 𝜇𝑧 = 𝜇 and 𝜎𝑧 =
1
√𝑛−3
 (where n is the sample 
size). 
Under the assumption of random effects, each 
study has an assigned weight equal to W that is 
calculated as follows: 
 
𝑊𝑖 =
1
𝑉𝑦
 
 
where 𝑉𝑦 is the within-study variance for the i-study 
plus the between-studies variance:  
 
𝑉𝑦 = 𝑉𝑦𝑖 + 𝑇
2 
 
Lastly, we calculate the variance and the 
estimated standard error of the overall effect, 
respectively as: 𝑉𝑀 =
1
∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
 and 𝑆𝐸𝑀 = √𝑉𝑀,  
where M is the weighted mean: 
 
𝑀 =
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑌𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
 
 
Then, with the 95% level of confidence, the 
lower and upper limits will result as: 𝐿𝐿𝑀 = 𝑀 −
1.96 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑀 and 𝑈𝐿𝑀 = 𝑀 + 1.96 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑀. 
The meta-analysis is run over the results 
obtained in previous academic papers related to 
Ownership structure of banks and their corporate 
governance, since the methodology requires a 
minimum number of papers to be included in the 
sample which have also to be homogeneous in terms 
of methodology. Thus, the meta-analysis is not 
comprehensive of all the research areas investigated 
in this paper but it is only focused on the relation 
between Ownership structure and both banks' 
performance and risk. The other research areas (e.g. 
Risk management and Compensation) have been 
analyzed with the systematic literature review as 
above presented.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1.  Ownership and performance 
 
At first, we run the meta-analysis over the sample of 
paper that analyze the relationship between 
Ownership structure and bank performance. The 
results of the analysis are summarized in Figure 1 
and Table 1, which show respectively the forest plot 
of the meta-analysis and the output table. Figure 1 
clearly shows that overall relationship between 
Ownership and performance is positive, strong and 
significant. This may be understand by looking at 
the last line of the Forest plot, which represents the 
weighted average effect size or “summary effect” 
and estimates the intervals in which the effect will 
most probably lie.   
Indeed, most of the confidence intervals are on 
the positive side of the x-axis. This lead to assert 
that there is a widely diffused finding in the 
literature on Ownership structure in banking, which 
is found to be relevant in increasing bank 
performance. In order to understand the in-between 
relations of the variables investigated, Figure 2 and 
Table 2 show the results of the subgroup analysis. In 
particular, selected papers are focused on the 
relation between banks performance and four 
different types of ownership: Board ownership 
(which is the portion of capital owned by directors 
of the banks); CEO ownership; Controlling 
shareholder (which is the percentage of capital 
owned by the controlling shareholder); State 
ownership. The subgroup analysis identify Board 
ownership, CEO ownership and Controlling 
shareholders as positively related to banks 
performance, with positive correlation coefficients 
(respectively equal to 0.04, 0.29 and 0.12). The most 
significative relationship is found with CEO 
ownership, since the confidence limits are very small 
and both in the positive side of the x-axis (CI lower 
limit is 0.24 and CI upper limit is 0.33). Conversely, 
State ownership seems to be significantly negative 
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related to banks performance, with a correlation 
coefficient equal to -0.18 and CI in the range (-0.24:-
0.12). 
 
Figure 1. Ownership and performance overall 
 
Figure 2. Ownership and performance – Subgroup 
analysis 
  
 
Table 1. Ownership and performance overall 
 
Study 
number 
Correlation 
(z) 
Number 
of 
subjects 
Variance 
(z) 
Standard 
error (z) 
Weight 
(random) 
CI 
Lower 
limit 
CI 
Upper 
Limit 
Weight 
% 
Residuals 
ES 
Forestplot 
CI Bar 
LL 
CI 
Bar 
UL 
1 -0,13 110 0,00935 0,1 23,04 -0,31 0,06 0,03 -0,3 -0,13 0,18 0,19 
2 -0,23 349 0,00289 0,05 27,07 -0,33 -0,13 0,03 -0,4 -0,23 0,1 0,1 
3 0,34 218 0,00465 0,07 25,84 0,21 0,44 0,03 0,18 0,33 0,12 0,11 
4 0,34 214 0,00474 0,07 25,78 0,2 0,45 0,03 0,18 0,33 0,13 0,12 
5 0,23 211 0,00481 0,07 25,73 0,1 0,35 0,03 0,07 0,23 0,13 0,12 
6 0,23 215 0,00472 0,07 25,79 0,1 0,35 0,03 0,07 0,23 0,13 0,12 
7 0,23 208 0,00488 0,07 25,69 0,1 0,36 0,03 0,07 0,23 0,13 0,13 
8 -0,04 634 0,00158 0,04 28,06 -0,12 0,04 0,03 -0,21 -0,04 0,08 0,08 
9 -0,19 213 0,00476 0,07 25,76 -0,31 -0,05 0,03 -0,36 -0,19 0,13 0,13 
10 -0,06 1 534 0,00065 0,03 28,81 -0,11 -0,01 0,03 -0,23 -0,06 0,05 0,05 
11 0,17 288 0,00351 0,06 26,62 0,06 0,28 0,03 0 0,17 0,11 0,11 
12 0,05 1 356 0,00074 0,03 28,74 0 0,1 0,03 -0,12 0,05 0,05 0,05 
 
Table 2. Ownership and performance – Subgroup analysis 
 
Subgroup name Correlation CI Lower limit CI Upper limit Weight I2 T2 
Board Ownership 0,04 -0,15 0,23 0,24 0,91 0,02 
CEO Ownership 0,29 0,24 0,33 0,25 0,89 0,03 
Controlling Shareholders 0,12 -0,06 0,29 0,25 0,66 0 
State Ownership -0,18 -0,24 -0,12 0,25 - - 
Combined effect size 0,07 -0,13 0,26 
 
0,92 0,03 
 
4.2.  Ownership and risk 
 
The second investigation is performed over the 
sample of papers that analyze the relationship 
between Ownership and risk. 
The overall analysis shows a significance of the 
results weaker than previous related to ownership 
and performance. Indeed, the Forest plot reported in 
Figure 3 and Table 3 show that there is not a 
predominant result in previous academic researches 
on this topic. The results of the subgroup analysis 
confirm that most of the academic are inconclusive. 
Figure 4 and Table 4 report the output of the 
analysis. In this case the subgroups are CEO 
ownership, Controlling shareholder and State 
ownership. The correlations coefficients are negative 
in all the three cases, but the confidence intervals 
are very large, thus unavailing to draw significance 
conclusion of the investigation. The most significant 
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result is obtained for the Controlling shareholder 
subgroup, which seems to increase of bank risk (as 
confirmed by the positive correlation equal to 0.04 
and the CI limits respectively at -0.03 and 0.10).  
 
Figure 3. Ownership and risk overall Figure 4. Ownership and risk - Subgroup analysis 
 
 
 
Table 3. Ownership and risk overall 
 
Study 
number 
Correlation 
(z) 
Number 
of 
subjects 
Variance 
(z) 
Standard 
error (z) 
Weight 
(random) 
CI 
Lower 
limit 
CI 
Upper 
Limit 
Weight 
% 
Residuals 
ES 
Forestplot 
CI 
Bar 
LL 
CI Bar 
UL 
1 -0,2 349 0,00289 0,05 63,73 -0,3 -0,1 0,06 -0,22 -0,2 0,1 0,1 
2 0,18 96 0,01075 0,1 42,46 -0,02 0,37 0,04 0,17 0,18 0,2 0,19 
3 0,02 298 0,00339 0,06 61,76 -0,09 0,13 0,06 0 0,02 0,11 0,11 
4 0,09 1 534 0,00065 0,03 74,33 0,04 0,14 0,07 0,07 0,09 0,05 0,05 
5 -0,13 288 0,00351 0,06 61,31 -0,24 -0,01 0,06 -0,15 -0,13 0,11 0,12 
 
Table 4. Ownership and risk - Subgroup analysis 
 
Subgroup name Correlation CI Lower limit CI Upper limit Weight I2 T2 
CEO Ownership 0,04 -0,16 0,23 0,29 0,96 0,01 
Controlling Shareholders 0,04 -0,03 0,1 0,39 0,52 0,01 
State Ownership -0,15 -0,69 0,5 0,31 0,52 0 
Combined effect size -0,02 -0,15 0,11 
 
0,84 0,01 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
There is an increasing understanding of the 
fundamentals of bank Corporate Governance such as 
risk management, ownership structure and 
compensation. This results from both banking and 
institutional perspective. The methodology entails a 
systematic literature review of the papers focused 
on this topic, and a meta-analysis assessment of 
previous academic findings on the relation between 
Ownership and both risk and performance of banks. 
As concerns risk management, the systematic 
literature review finds it is receiving increasing 
attention from academics since the crisis, and shows 
that published papers still present mixed result. The 
prevailing academic debate on compensation in bank 
is based on an agency theory that states executive 
compensation - and especially its variable part - is 
usually identified as one of the mechanism used to 
align managers' and shareholders' interests as well 
as to enhance executives' performance (Berle & 
Means, 1932; Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman & Hart, 
1983; Murphy, 1985). Nonetheless, also in this case 
there is not an univocal consensus on the relation 
between compensation and performance. Indeed, 
under the managerial power theory the executive 
incentive pay is perceived as a mechanism that 
misaligns executives' interests from those of 
shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 2010). However there is 
a wide consensus on the possible increase the risk-
taking behavior of bank managers as an effect of 
higher compensations. Lastly, the meta-analysis on 
ownership show an interesting result in the 
assessment of previous academic findings. In 
particular, even though any conclusion may be 
drawn for the association between ownership and 
risk, there is a clear and significant result obtained 
by investigating the relation between ownership and 
bank performance. The subgroup analysis clearly 
shows that Board ownership, CEO ownership and 
Controlling shareholder enhance the performance of 
banks. Conversely, State ownership is negatively 
associated with bank performance. However, there 
are some shortcoming associated with this 
methodology. The most important is a sample 
selection bias (e.g. heterogeneity or “apples and 
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oranges” issue as in Higgins & Thompson, 2002). 
which unable the results of the meta-analyses to be 
used with the aim of drawing general conclusion for 
the explored topic. From a methodology point of 
view, a further sensitivity analyses may be 
performed to verify if different selection criteria or 
different assumptions in the procedure lead to 
different findings (Lagasio & Cucari, 2018).  Scholars 
in this field may also further investigate the cross-
country differences in the relation between 
corporate governance and both performance and 
risk in banking. 
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